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WAR AND FAMINE IN AFRICA
Alex de Waal
In much of Africa, war has become synonymous
with famine. The glib commonplace, 'war plus
drought equals famine' grossly understates the com-
plexity and intimacy of the links between the two.
Some writers are content to enumerate the physical
destruction caused by war, the resources potentially
diverted from 'development', and the obstruction to
international relief efforts, to explain the links. While
containing some truth, this is no more sophisticated
nor comprehensive.
This article attempts a more wide-ranging, though
still preliminary, analysis. War creates famine es-
sentially for three reasons. The first is the consump-
tion of armies and the destruction of battle. The
second is that war is often designed to create famine;
certain siege tactics and counterinsurgency strate-
gies can have no other consequence when pursued
in Africa. The most severe famines in modern Africa
have been caused in this manner. Finally, we are
seeing the rapid development of political economies
based upon militarized asset-stripping. Though
analytically separate from war, this sort of predation
is often a facet of war, and is violent, hence it is
included here. Somalia is the most salient example.
This violence may have been silent at an earlier
moment in Africa's history, now it is very noisy.
Throughout, a small selection of examples is pre-
sented to illustrate the main points made. These
examples should not be seen in any sense as exhaus-
tive; there are numerous instances from all parts of
Africa and elsewhere which could also be adduced.
1 ARMIES AS CONSUMERS AND THE
DAMAGE OF BATTLE
The nineteenth century Emperor of Ethïopia,Teodros,
was once confronted with a complaint brought
against a peasant farmer who had killer a soldier
who was helping himself to the farmer's granary.
The Emperor responded tersely: 'Soldiers eat, peas-
ants provide' (Crummey 1986: 142).
The most direct and obvious ways in which war
creates famine can be simply dealt with. Even
former President Mengistu Haue Mariam of Ethio-
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pia was compelled at one point to admit that his
annual 'defence' budget could construct four major
universities or ten hospitals (Mengistu 1988). Some
of what has passed for an analysis of the origins of
famine in Mozambique is little more than a cata-
logue of Renamo vandalism.
There is a long history of armies creating famine by
requisitioning grain and other foodstuffs. This can
take the form of forcible requisitioning or billeting
soldiers on households. The fear of the impositions
of troops may cause households to conceal or even
destroy their food and possessions, or to abandon
their homes and hide in inaccessible areas. In Mo-
zambique, Renamo's practice of living off the land
has meant that food is scarce, and rural people have
gone hungry. During 1991 and 1992, much of
Renamo's strategy consisted of trying to maintain
control over productive rural populations, so as to
keep its fighters fed. As the burden of exactions
increased, more rural people began to try to flee
Renamo-controlled areas, while Renamo tried to
increase the size of the territory it controlled, particu-
larly in the more fertile areas of the country (Africa
Watch 1992: 126-30).
In recent times, armies have found that international
food aid, donated for the relief of hungry peasants,
is extremely accessible for requisitioning. In 1986,
the US General Accounting Office found that in
some places as little as 12 per cent of the international
food aid destined for refugees in Somalia was find-
ing its way to its intended recipients; much of the
remainder was being taken by the Somali army and
associated militias. Similar phenomena are familiar
from the famine in northern Ethiopia in the 1980s,
Mozambique, southern Sudan and elsewhere.
Armies are also prone to loot and pillage, in order to
sustain themselves, or for profit or booty. The
systematic raiding by Baggara Arab militias in Su-
dan of Dinka areas during 1985-8 was largely re-
sponsible for the catastrophic famine that overtook
parts of southwest Sudan at that time. The raiders
stole cattle and other livestock and household pos-
sessions, burned fields and villages, cut down trees,
poisoned wells, killed tens of thousands of men,
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women and children, and often took slaves as well
(Africa Watch 1990: 81-91). A similar extremity of
looting occurred on several occasions during 1991
and 1992 in Rahanweyn areas of southwest Somalia,
when local farmers were dispossessed of most of
their possessions by a succession of invading clan
militias. The last and most brutal looting was carried
out by forces loyal to the former dictator Siad Barre
in March and April 1992, and directly precipitated
the extremely severe famine that followed (Vaux
1992).
The conscription of large numbers of adult men may
contribute to labour shortages, and measures taken
by these young men to evade conscription, such as
hiding themselves or running away, may also make
it difficult for normal productive activities to progress.
As Mengistu Haue Mariam stepped up his efforts to
repulse rebel offensives in 1990 and 1991, the forcible
press-ganging of young men for military service
took on huge proportions; over 100,000 were seized
for the army in under a year. This seriously dis-
rupted productive activities in many southern parts
of Ethiopia. Women may also be conscripted to
serve as cooks, domestic servants, and prostitutes
for soldiers. This was common in many parts of
Ethiopia during the longwars foughtby the Mengistu
regime (Africa Watch 1991: 300-2).
At a national level, military budgets consume vast
amounts of resources that would otherwise be avail-
able for services or development. This has been the
case in Angola, where 'defence' expenditure ran at
approximately $1 billion per annum during the
1980s, compared with a gross domestic product of
under $5 billion (IISS 1989: 120). Alternatively,
military expenditure bankrupts governments, bring-
ing on economic and political crises. This was the
case in Ethiopia and Somalia, and threatens to be the
same in Sudan.
Armies also serve as disease vectors. Diseases such
as AIDS are closely associated with the progress of
armies. Some of the main epicentres of AIDS cases
in Africa coincide with areas where armies have
campaigned a few years previously. The Tanzanian
occupation of southwest Uganda in 1979 may well
be a case in point.
Battle itself can wreak enormous amounts of de-
struction, particularly if fought in economically im-
portant areas such as cities. There is the direct
destruction of houses, crops, foodstores, livestock,
and essential infrastructure such as roads, bridges,
ids bulletin vol 24 no 4 1993
34
port and airport infrastructure, dams, irrigation chan-
nels, clinics, schools, etc. Instances of this type of
damage to cities include the battle for Massawa in
Eritrea in February 1990, the battles in Monrovia,
Liberia, in late 1990, the fighting in Mogadishu,
Somalia, in January 1991 and between November
1991 and February 1992, and the battles in Juba,
Sudan, between June and September 1992. In rural
areas, major mechanized battles around Keren,
Eritrea, in 1978 and Cuito Cuanvale, Angola, on
several occasions in the 1980s, notably 1987-8, have
rendered useless important agricultural areas.
There is also the loss of land to mines and military
infrastructure such as trenches and encampments.
The trench warfare that was characteristic of Eritrea
during the 1980s meant that many areas of impor-
tance for local herders and cultivators were out of
bounds.
Land mines are a particular problem, as without
systematic clearance efforts they continue to remain
in the ground after the conflict has finished. In
northern Somalia, large amounts of pasture remain
unused due to the land mines planted by the Somali
army during its 1988 campaign against the rebel
Somali National Movement. Mines were planted
around strategic military and economic locations,
along most main roads, inside the city of Hargeisa,
around wells and reservoirs, and were scattered in
large numbers over fields and pastures. Even areas
that are not in fact mined remain unused by the local
population, because of the fear of mines. Angola is
another example of a country, this time with enor-
mous agricultural potential, where the widespread
and often random dissemination of anti-personnel
mines makes it impossible to carry out productive
activities in many areas (Africa Watch 1993).
In the immediate vicinity of battle, normal economic
activities are disrupted; farming and trade are usu-
ally impossible.
Battle can also cause extensive environmental dam-
age. Trees can be knocked down by tanks or set
ablaze by sheilfire or bombing (particularly if
incendaries or defoliants are used). Attacks on
munitions dumps or oil tanks can cause severe local
pollution. The destruction of forests by soldiers to
build trenches and emplacements, for firewood, or
to create clear sight lines can also be extremely
damaging. In Eritrea, much deforestation has been
caused by the former Ethiopian army, for each of
these reasons.
Sometimes, wholesale destruction can be a deliber-
ate military strategy. For example, the retreating
Soviet army in 1942 practised scorched earth tactics
in the face of the invading Germans. Anything that
could possibly have been of any economic or mili-
tary value to the invader was removed eastwards or
destroyed, including large amounts of food. Partly
as a result of this, the Ukraine suffered severe famine
during the following three years (Moskoff 1990: 22-
9).
In Mozambique, the rebel Renamo forces practised
a policy of 'conspicuous destruction', destroying
bridges, railway tracks, clinics, schools and almost
any form of infrastructure that existed except
churches. The aim was to advertise the presence and
strength of the rebels, cow the local population, and
terrorize supporters of the government. The prac-
tice of mutilating victims by cutting off lips, noses,
ears or sexual organs, and committing other spec-
tacular atrocities, was a logical development of this
strategy (Africa Watch 1992).
2 FAMINE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF WAR
The most severe famines in recent history have all
been caused when famine was used, usually deliber-
ately, as an instrument of war. War, fought in
particular ways, not only destroys 'objects indispen-
sable to the survival of the civilian population' (in
the words of the Additional Protocols of the Geneva
Conventions (ICRC 1977)), but systematically pre-
vents people from following coping strategies. It
may rapidly also precipitate social collapse. The
result is that frank starvation, possibly unknown in
modem peacetime famines, has become familiar
from war famines in Africa (de Waal 1990).
2.1 Sieges
During recorded history, armies have sought to use
hunger as a weapon to force their enemies to submit.
The classic instances of this occur during sieges.
Probably the most severe siege famine of the twen-
tieth century was the siege of Leningrad of 1941-4, in
which somewhere between 600,000 and one million
people died from the combined effects of hunger,
exposure and disease (Moskoff 1990: 185-206). The
surrounding German forces tried to starve the city
into submission by firebombing food warehouses
and, as far as possible, preventing supplies from
reaching the city. Simultaneously, the Allied pow-
ers maintained a strict blockade of German-occu-
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pied areas of the continent. This contributed to a
severe famine in Greece during 1942-3, which was
the occasion for the founding of the Oxford Commit-
tee for Famine Relief, later to become Oxfam (Black
1992).
Sieges have been widely used in civil conflicts in
Africa. In the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70, the
Federal Army's first response was to blockade the
area controlled by the Biafran secessionists (Stremlau
1977). This involved shelling ships (twice in June
1967) and attempting to shoot down aircraft. The
blockade extended to relief flights, and one aero-
plane operated by the International Committee of
the Red Cross was shot down in June 1969. The
Federal Government refused to let relief agencies
obtain free access to Biafra, arguing that relief flights
were used as cover for arms shipments. This claim
had an element of truth, as the main Biafran airstrip
at Uli was fitted out by relief agencies, and relief and
military flights arrived at the same time (by night)
and used the same facilities. In addition, there is
evidence that the relief food was used to feed the
Biafran army and bureaucracy.
The siege of Juba in southern Sudan is the longest-
running siege in contemporary Africa, having been
first imposed by the Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLA) in late-1984. Throughout the intervening
eight years, the SPLA has regularly blocked food
supplies to Juba. Commercial supplies were largely
prevented by encircling the city and blocking move-
ment, and by a ring of land mines on roads and
paths. Relief supplies have also been blocked; road
convoys have been attacked (on four occasions in
1987-8) and relief aircraft shot at (four occasions in
1986-8). On at least six other occasions, most re-
cently in 1992, the SPLA has declared its intention to
fire at any aeroplane, military or civilian, flying to
the town.
An important and often neglected element in the
way in which sieges create famine is the complicity
of the besieged army or government. In the USSR
during World War II, the Soviet government made
inadequate preparations to preserve stockpiles of
food in the months immediately before the siege,
failed to take all possible measures to mitigate the
impact of the siege, and concealed the true extent of
the suffering from the rest of the Soviet population
and the outside world. The Biafran secessionist
government also used the fact that it was besieged to
its military advantage, often at the expense of the
civilian population. For example, it made it impos-
-
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sible for relief and military flights to be separately
identified, thereby facilitating its arms supply but
making relief deliveries more difficult.
Juba is perhaps the most extreme example of the
complicity of the besieged forces. The example of
Juba differs from Leningrad and Biafra in that the
civilian population of the besieged town is seen by
the occupying army as actually or potentially hos-
tile, and sympathetic to the SPLA. The northern-
commanded army does little to protect the southern
civilians - on the contrary, it engages in frequent
sweeps to arrest, detain and execute residents. Army
officers have also worked closely together with north-
ern merchants to create and maintain artificial
scarcities of items such as fuel, sugar and staple
foods. This has been achieved by making overland
convoys infrequent (during 1985-8), deliberately
mixing relief, commercial and military supplies in
these convoys so that food cannot be made immune
from attack (and on one occasion in 1992, using an
aeroplane with UN insignia to fly in arms and
ammunition), blocking relief deliveries (for example
soldiers fired at a relief aircraft in 1988), and prevent-
ing residents leaving the city to obtain food from
outside (using patrols and land mines). Food prices
have remained high; merchant-officer partnerships
have made fortunes, while the residents of Juba have
gone hungry. Other garrison towns in southern
Sudan have similar stories.
2.2 Counterinsurgency
More insidious than sieges, but equally effective at
creating famine, are the use of modem counterinsur-
gency strategies, intended to impose maximum con-
trol over a potentially hostile population. Mao Tse
Tung famously described a guerrilla among the
people as like a fish in water, leading to the descrip-
lion of counter-guerrilla warfare as 'draining the sea
to catch the fish'.
The most systematic exponent of such counterinsur-
gency theories has been the French military. One of
the first theoreticians was General Lyautey, who
commanded the forces responsible for the pacifica-
tion of Morocco during 1912-25. Lyautey's pred-
ecessors discovered that conventional military en-
gagements could not hope to defeat an irregular
army, such as those fielded by the tribes of the
Moroccan interior. Instead, Lyautey developed what
he called the policy of the smile'. He argued 'the
pirate [guerrilla] is a plant which grows only in
certain ground ... the most efficient method is to
ids bulletin vol 24 no 4 1993
36
render the ground unsuitable to him.' (Gottman
1944:242). Lyautey characterized his army as '[civil]
organization on the march'.
In the context of the French conquest of Morocco,
Lyautey's policy meant establishing the centres of
French control as centres of attraction, compared to
the surrounding areas of anarchic rule. These cen-
tres then spread like an 'oil spot' throughout the
countryside. Establishing personal security for ordi-
nary people and expanding local commerce were
central to Lyautey's overall plan, and as such, it
promoted protection from famine.
Most modern counterinsurgency takes place in a
very different context. The society is already subject
to administration by governmental structures, and
these structures themselves are among the reasons
for the insurgency. In the following quotation, from
a French military advisor during the Algerian war,
'making the ground unsuitable' for the guerrilla
carries very different implications.
Anything that could facilitate the existence of the
guerillas in any way, or which could conceivably
be used by them - depots, shelters, caches, food
crops, houses, etc. - must be systematically de-
stroyed or brought in. All inhabitants and live-
stock must be evacuated from the [guerrillas']
refuge area. When they leave, the intervention
troops must not only have destroyed the [guer-
rilla] bands, but must leave behind them an area
empty of all resources and absolutely uninhabit-
able.
(Trinquier 1964: 85)
Some modern counterinsurgency campaigns have
been closer to the spirit of Lyautey, stressing the
need for the controlling forces to be subject to the law
(and seen to be so) and ensuring the provision of
compensatory assistance to the controlled popula-
tion. An example of this was the British campaign in
Malaya in the 1950s (Thompson 1966). However,
these have remained exceptions. More commonly,
military commanders have stressed the need to en-
gage and destroy the guerrilla forces, and have
treated the local population as though they were
actual enemies rather than potential allies. Rather
than winning the local population over from sup-
porting rebel forces, campaigns have been more akin
to meting out punishment.
In this context, counterinsurgency warfare in a poor
area is tantamount to creating famine. Three main
components of counterinsurgency are particularly
relevant. They are:
1 Population displacement to 'protected villages'
and related controls of the population;
2 Control of trade, especially in foodstuffs;
3 Control of movement of people.
The relocation of the civilian population to protected
villages or secure zones is one of the commonest
strategies used by counterinsurgency strategists. The
rationale is that the population can then be kept
under surveillance, so that guerrillas cannot infil-
trate or obtain recruits and supplies. The imposition
of counterinsurgency villagization is usually com-
bined with curfews, perimeter patrols, mining of
entrances, and other restrictions. Sometimes,
scorched earth is practised to compel people to come
to the villages.
This tactic has been common in Africa since the Boer
War, when the concentration camp was invented. It
was used by colonial armies fighting independence
movements in Algeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Zim-
babwe and elsewhere. Outside Africa, it is familiar
from Vietnam and Guatemala, to name only two
examples. On many occasions it has contributed to
famine.
Eritrea is one example. In 1967, the Imperial govern-
ment conducted a series of large military offensives
in Entrea, during which it burned over 300 villages,
relocating the people to fortified villages (Africa
Watch 1991: 42-6). Onerous restrictions were then
imposed in these villages. This effectively prevented
the inhabitants from carrying out the range of eco-
nomic activities that had previously sustained them.
Because of the curfew, many trading activities be-
came impossible. Far fields had to be abandoned,
and foraging for grass, wood and edible fruits in the
bush became very limited. Animal herding was
most difficult of all. Transhumance became impos-
sible, the grazing of village-based animals was lim-
ited to the distance which the animals could travel
during a few hours, and the long-established prac-
tice of grazing livestock at night (when it is cooler)
had to be abandoned altogether. By these means, the
viability of much of the lowland Eritrean economy
was undermined, leaving it vulnerable to famine.
More recently, villagization was implemented as a
counterinsurgency measure in western and eastern
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Ethiopia during 1984-8 (Africa Watch 1991: 231-6).
The rationale and consequences were very similar to
the earlier programme in Eritrea. The villagization
programme mounted by the Mozambican govern-
ment in Zambezia province in 1986-7, ostensibly for
the protection of rural people from Renamo attacks,
also contributed to the creation of a severe famine in
that area that was otherwise capable of producing
surpluses (Africa Watch 1992: 78-83, 115-16).
Control of trade was instrumental in creating famine
in Ethiopia in the 1980s. This has often been over-
looked, because of the (misleading) paradigm of the
self-provisioning peasant. In fact, no such peasants
exist; all are dependent to a greater or lesser extent on
exchanges with neighbours and neighbouring dis-
tricts. Intended or not, preventing those exchanges
proved an effective method of creating famine, largely
invisible to outside observers.
Government restrictions on private trade, particu-
larly trade in grain, were imposed throughout the
country. In the centre and south, this was ostensibly
for reasons of socialist transformation. Thousands
of lorry grain traders had their licences revoked, and
part-time pack-animal traders were subject to a be-
wildering range of requirements and taxes, to the
extent that 'it is unclear whether small scale grain
trade [wasi illegal or not' (Lirenso 1987: 52). In
insurgent areas, the roadblocks were more numer-
ous, and the latitude given to soldiers to confiscate
grain or animals was greater. Traders who were
unable to convince the soldiers that they were not
taking food to the rebels could also face arbitrary
imprisonment and fines. The result was that the
intra-regional food trade was choked off. The pock-
ets of deficit - that always existed - could not make
good their shortfalls, while in food surplus areas, the
harvests could not be transported out. The price of
grain in parts of northern Ethiopia rose to famine
levels as early as 1982; the famine arrived earlier and
struck harder because of these policies (Africa Watch
1991: 150-2). Meanwhile, in rebel-held areas, the air
force carried out a policy of systematically bombing
marketplaces. This forced markets to be held at
night, and greatly restricted trade.
Complementary to the restrictions on the grain trade,
the then-Ethiopian government exercised strict con-
trol of movement. All people had to have travel
permits before they were allowed to move outside
their villages, or they could be arrested as a rebel
suspect. This made labour migration, petty trade
and mutual assistance networks almost impossible,
-
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and was also instrumental in creating the famine
(Africa Watch 1991: 152-4).
In Sudan, restrictions on trade, movement and eco-
nomic activities were the final straw which precipi-
tated exceptionally severe famine among the Dinka
migrants in southern Kordofan in 1988. These peo-
ple, driven from their homes by the rapaciousness of
the Baggara Arab militias, were forced to seek sanc-
tuary in small towns controlled by those very mili-
tias. There, they were in effect kept in confinement,
denied opportunities to help themselves (by work-
ing for money, gathering wild foods or seeking
charity), denied access to the market on fair terms
(they could not buy food, and could only sell posses-
sions at extremely low prices), and denied the op-
portunity to escape. Death rates reached the unprec-
edented levels of one per cent per day in several
camps during the summer of 1988 as a result (Africa
Watch 1990: 128-30).
Counterinsurgency famines come about essentially
because the levels of restriction imposed upon the
population makes it impossible for that population
to remain self-provisioning. The population is then
reduced to a state of dependence. This can either
lead to starvation, or total control by the force con-
trolling the food supply. One particularly insidious
element in the strategy can be the use of international
relief.
By their nature, relief agencies search for destitute
and dependent populations in need of assistance.
Several African governments have realized that peo-
ple displaced by counterinsurgency operations fit
these criteria, especially if the agencies can be per-
suaded that the cause of the displacement is 'drought'
or 'bandits'. The assistance provided by the relief
agencies removes from the government the obliga-
tion and burden of supplying compensatory aid to
the people it has displaced. This can allow it to
maintain, extend or intensify a counterinsurgency
campaign in ways that might not otherwise have
been possible. It also gives a gloss of legitimacy to
such a campaign. What is for a military commander
a protected zone, may be for an inmate a concentra-
tion camp, but may appear to a relief agency (and
hence the international media) to be a feeding shel-
ter. Particularly striking examples of this come from
Ethiopia and Mozambique.
3 STATES OF WAR
In recent years, states have emerged in Africa based
upon the systematic asset-stripping of less powerful
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people. This is usually militarized and hence vio-
lent, though not always. Often, but by no means
always, militarized asset-stripping occurs in the con-
text of civil war. Including this form of political-
economic predation as a category of war famine is
therefore somewhat analytically misleading. How-
ever, because the most extreme and well-known
examples, such as Somalia, are normally presented
as war famines, and are indeed extremely violent,
this must be excused.
One of the first examples of systematic asset-strip-
ping was Zaire, whose rulers have been character-
ized as a 'kleptocracy'. Throughout the country and
at all levels, government officials and military offic-
ers sustain and enrich themselves through stealing
assets, increasingly often assets essential for the
survival or rural people (such as cattle), often using
force. For the most part, Zaire's abundance of food
has prevented decline into outright famine.
Sudan is another example in which the state and
those associated with it have sustained themselves
by transfers of assets. Partnerships between army
officers, militiamen (many of them cattle herders)
and businessmen have meant that, for some, war has
been extremely profitable. The raiding of Dinka
cattle by the Arab militia, with military, commercial
and political support, is one example; the creation of
artificial scarcities in southern garrison towns is
another. Outside the war zones, the expropriation of
large swathes of land used by smaliholders and
pastoralists to create commercial farms is also rap-
idly creating a very poor and vulnerable class of
labourers, who suffer famine in years such as 1990-
1 when the price of food soars beyond their reach.
This expropriation is carried out without outright
violence (though the implicit threat of violence is
always there), but is part of the same process.
-
In Somalia, these processes have gone a stage fur-
ther. During the 1980s, under Siad Barre, a group of
people with access to the state and foreign currency
were able to enrich themselves through seizing as-
sets and establishing monopolistic control of lucra-
tive businesses. Using the provisions of the land
reform act of 1975, those with connections in govern-
ment were able to acquire title to land, over which
others had customary rights. Commercial farms,
registered as cooperatives, were established. In the
Juba valley and adjoining areas, the beneficiaries
were mainly the Marehan, members of the same clan
as the President, and the losers were the Rahanweyn,
the relatively deprived clan of farmers indigenous to
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the area. Meanwhile, the most profitable businesses,
which included both normal commercial activities
and illegal activities such as arms dealing, cattle
rustling, the transit of ivory and smuggled gems,
and the diversion of foreign aid, were controlled by
a mafia-like network, also with connections to gov-
ernment.
As armed opposition to the regime intensified from
1988 onwards, trade (especially in cattle) and the
plantation-commercial farming economy became
increasingly militarized, initially for self-protection,
and then as a way of acquiring more trade goods and
assets. Cattle rustling merged into cattle raiding.
Commercial food traders kept competition at bay
with armed roadblocks demanding extortionate
payments, and other violent deterrents. The power-
ful businessmen and politicians were able to acquire
weaponry for themselves and their clansmen. The
Rahanweyn, Digil and Bantu as the most politically
marginal groups in the country, were unable to
acquire armaments to match their neighbours, and
were less well organized. As farmers, they were also
easy prey for the mobile pastoralists.
This process of the militarization and commerciali-
zation of government continued after Siad Barre was
driven from Mogadishu in January 1991. The fact
that Somalia no longer had a recognized sovereign
government closed off some avenues for wealth
acquisition - for instance, former government offi-
cials could no longer demand kickbacks for award-
ing contracts, and the Ministry of Finance could no
longer print money. However, the essentials of the
process continued unchanged, even heightened.
All the parties, including Siad's Somali National
Front (SNF), the two factions of the United Somali
Congress now occupying different parts of
Mogadishu, and other factions in the south, engaged
in an orgy of looting. This was a highly organized
orgy, financed by traders with international connec-
tions. In the cities, electrical goods, furniture and
household fittings, industrial equipment, copper
wiring - in fact, anything with a resale value - was
liable for looting and export to Kenya, Sudan or
Arabia. In the rural areas, looting started with
livestock, diesel pumps and household valuables
such as jewelry, but as the base of easily resaleable
assets diminished, the looters turned to ordinary
household items, clothes, and food. Some of this
was freelance looting by disaffected young men
with guns, but much of it was carried out by the
militia armies of Siad Barre and the other factions.
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Much of the time, these armies were not paid, and
sustained themselves through looting. When they
were paid, it was by commercial financiers with
specific interests, often in acquiring cattle or other
tradeable commodities.
The final, most systematic and most brutal round of
rural looting was carried out by the SNF in
Rahanweyn areas in March-April 1992, as the SNF
forces faced military defeat by the USC and flight to
Kenya. Large areas of Rahanweyn countryside were
stripped of everything that could be taken. The area
immediately descended into a famine of almost
unequalled severity.
During the Siad Barre years, the diversion of foreign
aid was a major source of income for the government
and those associated with it. The refugees in the
country received only a small part of what the
international community donated for them. After
Siad fell, most of the aid flows dried up, but insofar
as relief programmes continued, they were often
exploited by the merchant-politicians. The most
important way in which this occurred was through
protection rackets. Because of the low level of
personal security, relief agencies were obliged to
hire armed guards to protect themselves. They
usually hired guards from the very same factions
that were responsible for the political turmoil in the
country, thereby helping to enrich them. This be-
came a major factor in the second half of 1992, when
many more aid agencies rushed to the country to
start programmes, in the wake of the belated media
attention. The factions also ensured that, when
possible, relief was provided first to members of the
relevant clan, thereby ensuring that less accessible
and powerful clans, such as the Rahanweyn, were
last in the line. There was also looting of relief
shipments, though not on the scale often claimed by
the media and some of the less responsible relief
agencies.
The victims of the 1992 Somali famine were very
largely the Rahanweyn, and to a slightly lesser extent
Digil and Bantu. Those displaced by the fighting
also suffered severely. The pastoral clans for the
most part escaped severe hunger. The gradation of
suffering faithfully reflected the relative political
and military power of different groups, established
over the years.
The Somali famine is therefore a war famine, but
with important differences from the conventional
and guerrilla wars discussed earlier. The famine is
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not created by specific military strategies as such,
but instead by the military and predatory nature of
the political-economic structures in the country. The
famine is created, not by the way in which the
contending militias fight each other, but by the way
they sustain themselves as political and economic
forces. This type of war famine therefore falls into a
new category in the typology of war-created famine.
4 CONCLUSION
War is and will continue to be the major cause of
famine in Africa. Compared to other contributory
causes such as drought, environmental degradation,
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